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The MetaphQrics of Imitatio and Aemulatio 
Writings on imitation offer such a perplexing variety of 
doctrines that one needs no Nietzsche to advise not to allow the unity 
of the word imply a unity of the concept. Even after one has set aside 
discussions of literary representation deriving from Aristotle and 
Plato -- not always that easy a procedure as the example of Giovanfrancesco 
Pica shows one still finds numerous approaches and attitudes to 
rhetorical imitation, the use of models in learning to write well. l 
Imitation appears in so many different contexts: as a means of enriching 
a vulgar language (du Bellay), as a path to the sublime ("Longinus"), 
as the surest or only way to learn Latin (Delminio), as the way to become 
vis bonus dicendi peritus, with an emphasis on character-formation 
(Ramus), as a method for enriching one's writing with stylistic gems 
(Vida), as a reinforcement of one's natural inclinations (Poliziano) 
or a substitute for undesirable inclinations (Cortesi), and as providing 
the competitive stimulus necessary for achievement (Calcagnini). By 
no means does this list intend to pin an author to only one position, 
nor does it exhaust all the positions taken during antiquity and the 
Renaissance. A study of the imagery and metaphorics of writings on 
imitation allows one to sort out these positions and to grasp what all 
these precepts for language acquisition and literary production can 
teach someone trying to understand allusions in literary texts. 
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These topoi fall into three general classes, which I shall 
call transformative, dissimulative, and eristic. Trans formative 
includes apian, simian, filial, and digestive metaphors. Bees, digestion, 
and the resemblance of son to father are presented as successful examples 
of transforming a model; the ape, and also the crow, as failures. 
Dissimulative imagery and explicit advice of dissimulation refer to 
concealing or disguising the relation between text and model. Eristic, 
a term borrowed from "Longinus'" description of Plato's wrestling with 
Romer and his quotation of Resiod's agathe eris,covers not only struggle 
and competition, but also a large group of images connected with paths: 
following, surpassing, footsteps, leaders. 
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Because of the work of Gmelin and von Stackelberg the apian 
metaphor (Bienengleichnis) is probably the most familiar of all the 
images in writings on imitation. 2 More importantly, the apian metaphor 
is perhaps the most misleading topos because it is used to present two 
opposed conceptions of imitation: the poet as collector and the poet 
as maker. In other words the apian metaphor is not always transformative. 
The "digression" into natural history in Seneca's epistulae morales 
84, a central text for all later discussions of imitation, is essential: 
De illis [the bees) non satis constat utrum sucum ex floribus 
ducant qui protinus mel sit, an quae collegerunt in hunc 
saporem mixtura quadam et proprietate spiritus sui mutent. 
Quibusdam enim placet non faciendi mellis scientiam esse illis 
sed colligendi (4). 
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Seneca strengthens his advice with the other major image of 
transformation, digestion, at which point one realizes that he has been 
discussing digestion all along. The bees convert flowers into honey 
by a process, for our purposes and I suspect Seneca's in this letter, 
similar to digestion in men. In fact, his first mention of the bees 
contains at least a submerged reference to digestion: "flores ad mel 
faciendum idoneos carpunt, deinde quidquid attulere disponunt aC per 
favos digerunt" (3). Digero can mean distribute or arrange, in which 
case disponunt and digerunt are synonymous, but also means digest. 
Macrobius, who follows this letter very closely, and whose practice 
is much more that of the excerptor than the transformer, removes any 
ambiguity by substituting dividunt for digerunt (Sat. 1. pro 5). 
Macrobius, in fact, appears to be the first author to assume 
that the major point of Seneca's apian metaphor is not the bees' ability 
to transform pollen into honey, but their eclectic gathering of pollen 
from different flowers. Since Petrarch,3 it has been customary to 
criticize the discrepancy between the theory and practice of imitation 
in Macrobius, who certainly does excerpt large portions of Seneca's 
letter without acknowledgment or substantial transformation. 4 For 
Macrobius, however, imitation does not imply avoiding verbal repetition, 
a cardinal position in Petrarch and other later authors, but a 
rearranging of previous material. 5 Despite his adoption of Seneca's 
apian and digestive metaphors in language that insists on making something 
new and different, Macrobius is more concerned with reducing a mass of 
material into a useful order. Macrobius' own digestive metaphor is more 
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revealing than his transcription of Seneca's: 
nec indigeste tamquam in acervum congessimus digna memoratu: 
sed variarum rerum disparilitas, auctoribus diversa, confusa 
temporibus, ita in quoddam digesta corpus est, ut quae indistincte 
at que promiscue ad subsidium memoriae adnotaveramus, in ordinem 
ins tar membrorum cohaerentia convenirent 6 (1. pro 3). 
Seneca's digestive metaphor, however, does receive one significant 
addition. Macrobius quotes ~ • .!!!£E.. 84.5-6 ("Quod in corpore ••. ") 
with only insignificant variations (noted in Reynolds' apparatus of 
his OCT Seneca except for Macrobius' addition of male at 1. pro 7) 
until he reaches "ne aliena sint," where he makes a small, but crucial, 
addition: 
idem in his quibus aluntur ingenia praestemus, ut quaecumque 
hausimus non pat1amur integra esse, ne aliena sint, sed 
in quandam digeriem concoquantur: alioquin in memoriam ire 
possunt, non in ingenium (1. pro 7, my emphasis). 
Despite the ambiguity of digeries,I think Macrobius is here using 
it as Lewis and Short define it, citing this passage, "an orderly 
distribution, a disposition, arrangement." The addition reverses 
Seneca's passage in which complete metamorphosis and change of identity 
are the subject, not rearrangement. Macrobius' concern with organization, 
with ordo reappears in another addition to his transcription of Seneca: 
"nos quoque quidquid diversa lectione quaesivimus committemus stilo, 
ut in ordinem eodem digerente coalescc:t" (1.pr.6). This coalescing is 
not the transformation of pollen into honey, in which the pollen loses 
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its identity and becomes something else, but the redisposition of 
individual excerpts in an organized collection, a florilegium. 
Macrobius is culling flowers, not transforming, and consequently his 
practice is not that discrepant from his own conception of imitation, 
although he seems to have been unaware of the transformative implications 
of what he borrows from Seneca and only alert to the implications of eclectic 
gathering. After the passage from Seneca, Macrobius concludes:"tale 
[as in an orchestra and chorus] hoc praesens opus volo: multae in illo artes, 
multa praecepta sint, multarum aetatium exempla, sed in unum conspirata" 
(1 pro 10). Macrobius lifts the second clause verbatim from Seneca (84.10), 
in whom it refers to a mind that has absorbed and transformed a varied 
program of reading and imposed unity upon it; here in Macrobius "in unum 
conspirata" means little more than well-organized. 
Macrobius is an unusually complex example of the confusion of two 
opposed types of imitation inherent in the apian metaphor. Ordinarily 
one finds the flower-gathering and honey-making moments of imitation 
in different contexts. Poliziano's quotation of Lucretius offers two 
nontransformative uses of the apian metaphor: 
Itaque cum maximum sit vitium unum tan tum aliquem solumque imitari 
velIe, haud ab re profecto facimus, si non minus hos nobis quam 
illos praeponimus, si quae ad nostrum usum faciunt undique 
elicimus atque, ut est apud Lucretium, 
Floriferis ut apes in saltibus omnia libant, 
. ··d d· d" 7 omnla nos ltl em epasclmur aurea lcta. 
Lucretius' own use of the metaphor, in the proem to his third book, 
asserts his dependence on Epicurus, his refusal of aemulatio; Lucretius 
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pictures himself as gathering wisdom from his spiritual father (" tu 
pater as, rerum inventor"), not as modifying what he reads. Collecting 
doctrine from all of Epicurus is the point of the comparison. Poliziano, 
strictly speaking, is only utilizing the aspect of gathering from 
everywhere, for elsewhere he disapproves of imitation without emulation 
and insists, by digestive metaphor, on transformative imitation. 8 In 
the present passage, however, his primary concern is to justify his 
choice of Quintilian and Stat ius as worthy of study although inferior 
to Cicero and Virgil. Poliziano is arguing for eclectic imitation, 
the study and use of all good authors. 
A few more instances of apian metaphors in nontransformative 
contexts may be quoted to show their general diffusion in the Renaissance 
since reading von Stachelberg's collection of Bienengleichnisse, one 
feels that only medieval authors use them to mean gathering. Ronsard 
uses the metaphor at least four times, in each case only in the sense 
of gathering material in eclectic fashion. 9 The most revealing use is 
in "Sonnet, a M. des Caurres, sur son livre de Miscellanees": 
Ainsi qu'au mois d'avril on voit de fleur en fleur, 
De jardin en jardin, l'ingenieuse abeille 
Voleter et piller une moisson vermeille 
En ses pieds peinturez de diverse couleur; 
De science en science, et d'autheur en autheur, 
De labeur en labeur, de merveille en merveille, 
Tu voles, repaissant diversement l'oreille 
Du Fran~ois, tout ravy d'estre ton auditeur. 
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Ronsard's sonnet is praising a florilegium, with which it appeared 
in 1575, as is evident from its full title: Oeuvres morales et 
diversifiees en histories, pleines de beaux exemples, enrichies 
d'enseignemens vertueux et embellies de plusieurs sentences et 
discours; Ie tout tire des plus signalez at remarguables autheurs grecs, 
1 · f . . t . d 10 at~ns et ran~o~s, gu~ on escr~t e tous temps. Des Caurres 
is a gatherer, not a transformer, a virtuous thief (piller). 
As the quotation from Poliziano may suggest, the apian 
metaphor appears in debates over the question whether or not Cicero 
alone is to be taken as the model for prose. The gathering aspect of 
the bees becomes a weapon in the eclectics' arsenal. Giraldi, a moderate 
Ciceronian, uses the metaphor as a typical argument of the eclectics; 
one notices how he passes over the bees' making (condendo, condiant) 
to focus on the variety of flowers: 
Nam quoniam vix fieri posse opinantur ut unius industria 
omnia perficere potuerit, haec quae ad orationis candorem et 
stili gravitatem attinent, more apum hinc inde perquirenda 
arbitrantur. Nam veluti apes in melle condendo, non ex uno 
tantum, sed ex omnibus floribus id sibi colligunt ex quo mel 
ipsum condiant, ita a Cicerone schemata, epicheremata, parabolas, 
sales, a Quintiliano leporem, gratiam, energiam, a Salustio 
sanguinem, cutem, carnem, a Caesare nervos, cartilagines, ossa, 
a Plinio acumen, vim, spiritum, et, brevi, quaecunque orationem 
illustrem reddunt, a divers is exquirenda praecipiunt. ll 
Giraldi at once attacks this position, but the importance of the 
passage lies in its purported exemplariness; it shows the diffusion 
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of the tapas in its nontransformative application. A final example 
from Ramus: "At que ut apes e variis variarum arborum floribus 
mellificant; sic e poetarum, historicorum, oratorum omninoque bene 
loquentium hominum dictis et scriptis, sermonis copiam et elegantiam 
comparabit.,,12 Ramus is discussing vocabulary acquisition and the 
enriching of the French language, and his Ciceronianus does not 
advocate transformative imitation, but advises students to take Cicero 
as a model to become vir bonus dicendi peritus, especially a vir bonus. 
One need not dwell on the transformative application of the 
apian metaphor since von Stachelberg provides so many examples. One 
can sum it up with one sentence from Petrarch: "Neve diutius apud te 
qualia decerpseris maneant, cave: nulla quidem esset apibus gloria, 
nisi in aliud et in mel ius invent a converterent.,,13 Here the emphasis 
on transformation is complete. What's gathered must become aliud. 
In Seneca the apian and digestive metaphors reinforce one 
another and are closely analogous. The digestive metaphor has just 
as long a history as the apian, but, with the exception of Cortesi, 
who uses it as an argument against eclecticism (indigestion from 
eating too many different foods at the same time)14, is always used 
to support trans formative imitation. After Seneca, one finds it in 
Quintilian, Macrobius, Petrarch, Poliziano, Erasmus, Calcagnini, 
Dolet, Florido, Du Bellay, Sidney, and Jonson;15 I quote one of 
Erasmus' versions of the topos as representative: 
Rursus imitationem probo non uni addictam praescripto, a cuius 
lineis non ausit discedere, sed ex omnibus autoribus, aut certe 
praestantissimis, quod in quoque praecellit maxime tuoque 
congruit ingenio decerpentem, nec statim attexentem orationi 
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quicquid occurrit bellum sed in ipsum animum uelut in stomachum 
traiicientem, ut transfusum in uenas, ex ingenio tuo natum non 
aliunde emendicatuum esse uideatur, ac mentis naturaeque tuae 
uigorem et indolem spiret, ut qui legit non agnoscat emblema 
Ciceroni detractum, sed foetum a tuo natum cerebro, quemadmodum 
Palladem aiunt a cerebro louis, uiuam parentis imaginem referentem, 
nec oratio tua cento quispiam uideatur aut opus musaicum, sed 
spirans imago tui pectoris, aut amnis a fonte cordis tui promanans.16 
Although certain elements of this long sentence are peculiar to 
Erasmus' conception of imitation, one can justly call it a representative 
instance of the digestive topos for several reasons. First, the 
metaphors which theorists of imitation use do not appear as incidental 
ornaments; they usually carry the burden of what the theorist has to 
say and come at the crucial moments of his argument. In this passage 
Bulephorus, after having ridiculed extreme Ciceronianism and having 
argued for eclecticism, is stating his own conception of imitation. 
All of Erasmus' major concerns appear here with the exception of the 
fear that Ciceronianism is a disguise for paganism, and even this is 
implicit in the reference to decorum (congruit). For, as I shall show 
later, historical decorum which forbids the use of exclusively pagan 
terms in Christian contexts, is the central concept and concern of the 
Ciceronianus. This sentence also states a preference for eclectic 
rather than Ciceronian imitation, and Erasmus' insistence, unusual in 
treatises on imitation, on sincerity ("spirans imago tui pectoris,,)17 
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as essential for good writing. The passage is also typical -- one 
need only think of Seneca's ep. mor. 84 of the way in which 
imitative metaphors come in clusters. Besides, of course, the digestive 
metaphor one has a suggestion of via imagery (discedere), a reference 
to mosaics and begging, and a child/parent comparison, all traditional, 
although Erasmus uses the filial image unlike Seneca, Petrarch, and 
Cortesi18 . Finally, Erasmus thoroughly emphasizes transformation 
through digestion; a reader won't recognize (non agnoscat) Cicero as 
model. 
With non agnoscat a new class of imitative imagery and 
doctrine appears: dissimulation. Theorists, as this sentence from 
the Ciceronianus may suggest, often regard transformation as the means 
to the end of dissimulation, although scholars have not paid much 
attention to the persistent advice to disguise the relationship between 
text and model. In a certain sense this advice is nothing more than 
an extension of the adage ars est celare artem to imitation, as in 
Erasmus: 
An non hoc ipse docuit Cicero, caput artis esse dissimulare 
artem? . • • Itaque si feliciter Ciceronem imitari uolumus, 
dissimulanda cum primis est ipsa Ciceronis imitatio (p. 84). 
Before proceeding to the consequences dissimulation has for a reader 
of imitative literature, I would like to give an idea of the extent 
of dissimulative advice and imagery. Practically all of the important 
doctrines and metaphors of imitation appear in Seneca's ep. mor. 84, 
so it should offer no surprise that he counsels dissimulation: "Hoc 
faciat animus noster: omnia quibus est adiutus abscondat, ipsum tantum 
11 
ostendat quod effecit" (7). This exhortation, which Macrobius takes 
so literally that he transfers it, along with other chunks of Seneca's 
letter, to his Saturnalia without any hint that he is using Seneca, 
appears just after the apian and digestive metaphors: Seneca is the 
first to link transformation and dissimulation. 
Petrarch, while developing Seneca's comparison of the proper 
similarity between text and model to the resemblance of father to son, 
also dwells on dissimulation. He is writing to Boccaccio about the 
difficulty of avoiding unconscious verbal reminiscence and casting 
himself as father to Giovanni Malpaghini, his young secretary, who 
often inserts Virgilian phrases into his own poems. In this case the 
son turns out to be only too like his father; Giovanni produces a 
line from Petrarch's own Bucolicum Carmen as a justification for 
lifting a phrase from Virgil. Petrarch's theory of unconscious 
reminiscence deserves more attention. Here, however, one notes how 
it spoils the insistence on concealing the model and how it leads 
Petrarch to reflect on human impotence: "quin multum semper humanis 
desit intentionibus" (Fam. 23.19.17). Nevertheless the dissimulative 
advice is fundamental: 
Firmabit, ut spero, animum ac stilum, et ex multis unum suum ac 
proprium conflabit, et imitationem non dicam fugiet sed 
celabit, sic ut nulli similis appareat sed ex veteribus novum 
quod dam Latio intulisse videatur (10). 
Here again one notices the combination of concealing and transforming: 
making something new from a variety of sources and then disguising the 
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process that has produced the proprium. Advice which Petrarch is 
following, for his sentence conceals an allusion to a famous line 
of Horace: "Graecia capta ferum victorem cepit et artis/intulit 
agresti Latio" (epis. 2.1.156-7). A few lines later Petrarch restates 
his position on dissimulation: 
Sic et nobis providendum ut cum simile aliquid sit, multa 
sint dissimilia, et id ipsum simile lateat ne deprehendi possit 
nisi tacita mentis indagine, ut intelligi simile queat 
potiusquam dici (13). 
The nisi clause allows for partial dissimulation. The relation between text 
and model is not necessarily to be obliterated or completely disguised, 
the possibility of alluding in order to be recognized is left open:9 
Petrarch's last-quoted pronouncement on dissimulation stops 
just short of addressing different audiences. Some later theorists 
take this step. Landino, for instance, in his Disputationes 
Camaldulenses, has Lorenzo de'Medici exclaim that he now understands 
why Dante descends to hell and purgatory before ascending to heaven. 
Alberti praises Lorenzo for seeing dissimulata in Dante's imitation of 
Virgil, to which Lorenzo replies: 
Quamobrem nunc id demum intelligo, quod nos ex Ciceronis 
praecepto saepenumero Landinus admonere solet: esse in aliquo 
imitando diligentem omnino rationem adhibendam, neque enim id 
agendum, ut idem simus qui sunt ii quos imitamur, sed eorum 
ita similes, ut ipsa similitudo vix ilIa quidem neque nisi a 
d . . 11' 20 oct1S 1nte 19atur. 
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Sturm states this imitation for the learned doctrine succinctly: 
"Latet imitatio, non extat, occultat se, non detegit: neque inte1ligi 
vult, nisi ab erudito" (De im. oratoria 2.3). 
Sturm, in fact, is the theorist most insistent on dissimu-
lation, although Parthenio also offers specific advice on how to 
"nasconder la cosa.,,2l One of Sturm's chapters (3.1) in his major work 
on imitation, De imitationeoratoria, which Ascham requests to see in 
manuscript while writing his Scholemaster,22 is entitled, "De 
occultanda imitatione," Sturm's own schola to which reads: 
'I- I I 
Oportet imitatorem esse .. )'''~o I'-A"/TTO"; oportet f(.). eITT<!'I{ furari, 
furem esse ~~~DV, id est imitationis: sed ita tamen, ut ipsum 
furtum non appareat, ne ipsa scilicet, cornicula in furto 
deprehendatur, et risum moveat, et suis notetur coloribus. 
Oportet nos imitatione, ex alieno facere proprium. Oportet 
I ,~ I 
f(.A<!1'lT<!'V 'Tov ~';::(,\o'" id est, II-,&.AUTTTt-.V, abscondere. 
With this general principal in mind Sturm proceeds to list six 
"occultationis partes," ways in which an imitator can disguise his 
theft. 
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What can these transformative and dissimulative metaphors 
tell someone who is trying to understand an imitative poem? What help 
do they offer a reader who confronts, say, a passage in a Renaissance 
poem which strongly resembles one in a classical poem? What sort of 
expectations should such a reader have? Can one translate this advice 
for literary production into a guide for interpretation? On the basis 
of the transformative and dissimulative aspects of imitation,only one 
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principle emerges. A reader must be very cautious in even calling 
a similarity between two texts an imitation or an allusion, much less in 
analyzing the use or significance of the similarity. 
This less than inspiring principle, which could be fairly 
stated much more skeptically, confronts one at every turn. First, 
transformation of the model into something new and different, especially 
when transformation is conceived as the means of hiding a text's relation 
to its model, calls into question the possibility of identifying the 
model. A thoroughly dissimulated transformation would not be understood 
even "tacita mentis indagine"; the relation between text and model 
disappears. Or even if the relation is grasped by the silent searching 
of a learned mind, one wonders about a communicative intent that is so 
carefully concealed. The relation may be crucial for understanding the 
text's genesis or the author's reading, but insignificant for an 
interpretation of the text itself. 
Assuming, however, that a reader has identified a model or 
models, another intentional problem arises. One way to approach it is 
to examine a conflict implicit in the apian and digestive analogies as 
Seneca uses them: 
nos quoque has apes debemus imitari et quaecumque ex divers a 
lectione congessimus separare (mel ius enim distincta servantur), 
deinde adhibita ingenii nostri cura et facultate in unum sapo rem 
varia ilIa libamenta confundere, ut etiam si apparuerit unde 
sumptum sit, aliud tamen esse quam unde sumptum est appareat. 
Quod in corpore nostro videmus sine ulla opera nostra facere 
naturam .•. (~.mor.84.5-6) 
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The "sine ulla opera nostra" of digestion makes all the difference. 
Does a similarity between text and model result from conscious intention 
("adhibita ingenii nostri cura") or an unconscious process?23 The 
constant advice to digest or assimilate one's reading makes it highly 
probable that some unconscious absorption and reproduction will take 
place. Petrarch's story about Giovanni Malpaghini and the Virgil ian 
phrase in Bucolicum Carmen 6 furnishes one instance of unconscious 
reminiscence, and another letter of Petrarch provides a disturbingly 
persuasive analysis of the consequences of complete assimilation, 
although one must make some allowance for Petrarch's obvious desire to 
impress Boccaccio with the paradox of the title: "sepe facilius his 
scribentem falli que familiariter novit." 
Petrarch distinguishes between two classes of reading which he 
has done. On the one hand are authors like Ennius and Plautus, whom 
he read only once and quickly at that; if he memorized anything of 
theirs, its alienness to his own thoughts made it stand in his memory 
as another's. He describes his other reading as follows: 
Legi apud Virgilium apud Flaccum apud Severinum apud Tullium; 
nec semel legi sed milies, nec cucurri sed incubui, et totis 
ingenii nisibus immoratus sum; mane comedi quod sero digererem, 
hausi puer quod senior ruminarem. Hec se michi tam familiariter 
ingessere et non modo memorie sed medullis affixa sunt unumque 
cum ingenio facta sunt meo, ut etsi per omnem vitam amplius non 
legantur, ipsa quidem hereant, act is in intima animi parte radicibus, 
sed interdum obliviscar auctorem, quippe qui longo usu et possessione 
continua quasi ilIa prescripserim diuque pro meis habuerim, et 
turba talium obsessus, nec cuius sint certe nec aliena meminerim 
(Fam. 22.2.12-3). 
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This aspect of unconscious reminiscence offers particular difficulties 
because it casts doubts on just those texts to which one would suppose 
an author would allude. For one usually feels most confident calling a 
similarity between two texts an allusion when the putative model is a 
famous work or a work known to be familiar to the author of the 
"alluding" text. An analogue from everyday experience may help clarify 
Petrarch's explanation and also remove any suspicion that he is 
exaggerating to make a paradoxical, epigrammatic "point." Most students 
have had an "original" idea that a later accident, for instance rer.eading 
lecture notes after some time has elapsed, has suddenly shown to have 
been their teachers', but the teaching had been so well digested by the 
students that it became a part of their thinking, not an element lodged 
in their memories. 
The emphasis on transforming a model and then disguising the 
relationship to it, besides raising difficulties of interpreting 
intention (and in matters of imitation and allusion Petrarch's "quin 
multum semper humanis desit intentionibus" is particularly forceful), 
also calls attention to a necessary distinction between imitation and 
allusion. An imitation may not result in an allusion, but, then again, 
it may, and of course the crucial moment in interpretation involves 
choosing between the two possibilities. Nevertheless some imitations 
may only have importance as far as the genesis of a text is concerned; 
they may have no function in the text itself and indeed may disrupt the 
author's intended function of his text by not being well concEaled. 
Consequently, as far as function is concerned, the interpreter who seeks 
relations between texts that contain similarities may be misguided. 
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The counsel of a dissinulated imitation only to be understood by 
the learned suggests different kinds of function. Landino conceives 
the highest kind of poetry (Virgil, Dante) as only written for the 
learned, so that a hidden allusion, just like the hidden allegory of 
Aeneid 1-6 which Alberti so subtly develops, probably has considerable 
significance. The fact of an imitation's concealment, therefore, does 
not necessarily imply absence of function. In other cases, however, the 
function may be no more than to allow the learned reader the pleasure of 
recognizing a phrase from an ancient poet. E. K., for example, in his 
letter affixed to Spenser's Shepheardes Calendar, mentions the poetic 
custom of first trying one's powers with pastoral poetry and cites some 
authors who followed this Virgilian prog~ession, "whose foting this 
Author every mere followeth, yet so as few, but they be weI sented 
can trace him out.,,24 This clause reads like an invitation to the 
learned to listen for echoes of ancient pastoralists. 
Besides the possibility of allusions only for the erudite, one 
may encounter allusions, plays on words, designed only for the author's 
pleasure -- another type of imitation that may not function in a work. 
Vida is explicit on this point: "Saepe mihi placet antiquis alludere 
dictis, / Atque aliud lange verbis proferre sub iisdem.,,25 Pleasure 
for the learned or pleasure for the writer both may reduce imitation 
to a matter of genesis. I don't mean to belittle studies of genesis, 
but one cannot overlook the confusion created in failures to distinguish 
questions of genesis and function. 
The apian metaphor of eclectic gathering of vocabulary and the 
specific advice of ways to transform and disguise good phrases are 
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symptomatic of a tendency in writings on imitation: the reduction 
of imitation to matters of elocutio. In his manuscript of 
Quintilian, next to 10.2.27, "Imitatio [auteml, nam saepius idem 
dicam, non sit tantum in verbis," Petrarch wrote himself a note, 
"Lege, Silvane, memoriter.,,26 Both Quintilian and Petrarch, however, 
devote more theoretical energy to discussing style than inventio or 
dispositio. They are typical in exhorting writers to extend imitation 
beyond elocutio and in neglecting to do much more than exhort. Vida 
treats imitatio primarily as a matter of diction, although he offers 
the customary admonition to imitate the other two parts of rhetoric: 
"rerum accipimus nunc clara reperta, / Nunc seriem" (3.214-5). He 
quickly returns to his main interest and shows himself an extremist 
by recommending the theft of "verba ipsa." Ordinarily theft belongs 
to the vocabulary of failed transformation and is used to attack. 27 
Only, Vida, to my knowledge, exalts theft into a term of praise, 
28 
although one finds a hint in Macrobius (Sat. 6.1.3) . In any case 
Vida's conception of imitation as theft, the extreme version of 
imitation as gathering stylistic beauties, indicates that some 
imitations are limited to style and do not bring the text and model 
into relation in any other way. 
So far an examination of the trans formative and dissimulative 
aspects of imitation has produced only difficulties, all relating in 
some way to the major hermeneutical problem of the possibility and 
importance of assessing authorial intention. The discussions of 
imitation call into question the possibility of identifying a model, 
or assuming agreement on the existence and identity of a model, the 
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possibility of positing or understanding the use of the model. No 
method for progressing from the observation of resemblance between 
two texts to an assertion of relation between them has yet emerged. 
So far there is very little evidence, from the theorists of imitation, 
to justify imitation as anything other than an element in the genesis 
of a text. The third class of analogies for imitation, however, 
eristic metaphors, does open the possibility of regarding an imitation 
as an important function of the text itself. 
-3-
The two most striking eristic analogies I have found raise 
competition or strife to a necessary condition for creativity. In 
"Longinus'" original and stimulating discussion of imitation one 
finds this comment on Plato's indebtedness to Homer: 
Nor does it seem to me that he would have excelled so much 
in his philosophical doctrines or would have so often hit on 
poetical subject matter and expression, had he not, by God, 
with all his heart struggled with Homer for preeminence, like 
a young competitor against an already admired one, perhaps 
too contentiously and, as it were, breaking a lance with him, 
but nevertheless not without profit. For, according to Hesiod, 
"This strife [eris) is good for mortals." And truly this 
contest for the crown of glory is noble and most worth winning, 
in which even to be defeated by one's elders is not inglorious 
(13. 4-5, my translation). 
"Longinus '" optimism knows no burden of the past; he advises aspiring 
speakers to imagine how Plato, Demosthenes, or Thucydides would have 
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treated a topic or to imagine their reactions to his speech. 29 The 
very act of emulation (zelos) somehow raises the soul of the emulator 
towards the standards he imagines. "Longinus" attributes a certain 
mystery to emulation -- earlier he compares it to the inspiration of 
the Pythian priestess -- and this mystery also attaches to competition. 
How it works does not matter as much to "Longinus" as to the fact 
it does work. 
Calcagnini closes his letter, de imitatione, to Giraldi with 
the story of the birth of Anteros. Venus, worried why Cupid (Eros), 
her newly-born son, was not growing, asked Themis for advice. Themis 
replied that Cupid would grow if Venus had another son for Cupid to 
compete with. And after the birth of Anteros, Cupid, of course, had 
a growth spurt. Calcagnini draws the moral in the closing sentences 
of his letter: 
Ex iis puto facile colligas nulla praeclara ingenia posse ingentes 
profectus facer e , nisi habeant antagonistem, ut Graeci dicunt, 
quicum decertent, quicum colluctentur. Neque solum oportet ut 
cum aequa1ibus viventibusque contendamus, sed cum iis etiam qui 
olim scripserunt, quos "mutos magistros" appelamus. Alioqui futuri 
semper infantes (Trattati 1.220). 
Imitation as competition with one's model receives no stronger formulation 
in the Renaissance. 
Calcagnini's passage, however, contains two terms that are 
commonplaces in discussions of imitation, commonplaces that help justify 
a distinction between imitation and emulation: decertent and contendamus. 
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Forms of certo and contendo, often in opposition to forms of sequor, 
compose one large class of eristic metaphors and occasionally appear 
with the other major class, a cluster of images associated with paths, 
via (or callis or a similar word), dux, vestigium. Both classes are 
used to advocate both imitation and emulation, depending on the theorist's 
view of competition and the possibility of successful competition. 
Before discussing the distinction between imitation and emulation and 
its consequences for reading imitative literature, I would like to give 
some indication of the frequency and divergent applications of the eristic 
metaphors because they have not received much attention. 
Two important passages from antiquity discuss paraphrase and 
translation as competition. Quintilian's disagreement with Cicero's 
judgment on the usefulness of paraphrasing a speaker in the same 
language received considerable attention in the Renaissance; the 
possibility of paraphrase practically becomes a topos in Ciceronian 
debates on eclecticism. 3D Quintilian supports his argument for 
competitive paraphrase by asserting that many paths lead to eloquence. 
Neque ego paraphrasin esse interpretationem tantum uolo, sed 
circa eosdem sensus certamen at que aemulationem. Ideoque ab 
illis dissentio qui uertere orationes Latinas uetant quia 
optimis occupatis quidquid aliter dixerimus necesse sit esse 
deterius. Nam neque semper est desperandum aliquid illis quae 
dicta sunt melius posse reperiri, neque adeo ieiunam ac pauperem 
natura eloquentiam fecit ut una de re bene dici nisi semel non 
possit. . • . An uero ipsi non bis ac saepius de eadem re dicimus 
et quidem continuas nonnumquam sententias? -- nisi forte 
contendere nobiscum possumus, cum aliis non possumus. Nam si 
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uno genere bene diceretur, fas erat existimari praeclusam 
nobis a prioribus uiam: nunc uero innumerabiles sunt modi, 
plurimaeque eodem uiae ducunt (10.5.5). 
The possibility of different, but nevertheless excellent ways of 
writing on the same subject is the theoretical basis for emulation 
or competition. The eclectic position makes striving with oneself 
and others possible. 
In answer to a request for advice on a method for study Pliny 
recommends translating from Greek to Latin or vice versa. Not only will 
translation lead to a better understanding of what is read and improve 
one's diction and invention: 
Nihil offuerit quae legeris hactenus, ut rem argumentumque teneas, 
quasi aemulum scribere lectisque conferre, ac sedulo pensitare, 
quid tu quid ille commodius. Magna gratulatio si non nulla tu, 
magnus pudor si cuncta ille melius. Licebit interdum et notissima 
eligere et certare cum electis. Audax haec, non tamen improba, 
quia secreta contentio: quamquam multos uidemus eius modi 
certamina sibi cum multa laude sumpsisse, quos que subsequi satis 
habebant, dum non desperant, antecessisse (epis. 7.9.3-4). 
This contentio or certamen is far from a violent battle. Pliny is 
certainly aware that contentiousness may be behind contentio. In his 
frequent uses of aemulatio and imitatio one detects a mixture of the 
moral and the technical, a point to which I shall return. 3l 
The juxtaposition of subsequi and antecessisse in this 
passage from Pliny is one version of a common eristic opposition which 
first appears in Lucretius: 
o tenebris tantis tam clarum extollere lumen 
qui primus potuisti inlustrans commoda uitae, 
te sequor, 0 Graiae gent is decus, inque tuis nunc 
ficta pedum pono pressis uestigia signis, 
non ita certandi cupidus quam propter amorem 
quod te imitari aueo: quid enim contendat hirundo 
cycnis, aut quidnam tremulis facere artubus haedi 
consimile in cursu possint et fortis equi uis? (3.1-8) 
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Lucretius equates imitation with following the footsteps of his master 
and rejects what will later be called emulation as contentiousness 
("certandi cupidus") and because of the futility of striving 
(contendat) with Epjcurus. This type of following rejects transformation 
of inventio; Lucretius' use of the bees as gatherers comes immediately 
after the lines quoted above. Elsewhere in his poem, however, Lucretius 
asserts the originality of treating such difficult subjects in Latin 
verse -- "obscura de re tam lucida pango I carmina" (1.933-4=4.8-9) --
by reversing the uestigia topos: "avia Pieridum peragro loca nullius 
ante / trita solo (1.926-7~4.l-2). Horace makes a different claim for 
originality -- use of the metrics, not the matter, of Archilochus, 
Sappho, Alcaeus in similar terms: "libera per vacuum posui vestigia 
princeps, / non aliena meo pressi pede" (epis. 1.19.21-2). 
Although one finds numerous examples of vestigia used to 
state a preference for imitatio over aemulatio, the other instances of 
the contendere I sequi opposition all support emulation. Quintilian's 
brief discussion was probably the single most influential statement: 32 
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Sed etiam qui summa non adpetent, contendere potius quam 
sequi debent. Nam qui hoc agit, ut prior sit, forsitan, etiam 
si non transierit, aequabit. Eum uero nemo potest aequare 
cuius uesti~~ sibi utique insistendum putat: necesse est enim 
semper sit posterior qui sequitur (10.2.9-10). 
Quintilian is recommending aemulatio rather than imitatio and closes 
his chapter with another eristic term: "Nam erit haec quoque laus 
eorum, ut priores superasse, posteros docuisse dicantur" (28). The 
fact that he doesn't use aemulatio as a technical term here casts 
considerable doubt on Reiff's thesis that aemulatio emerges as a fixed 
term in Tiberius' time. 33 
One of the few points of agreement between Pico and Bembo 
in their exchange of letters on imitation is a preference for striving 
to surpass rather than for following. Pico, after citing Plato's 
criticism of imitators and Horace's "servum pecus," asserts: 
Hinc videas omneis quicumque aliqua in re auctores celeberrimi 
extiterunt, aliunde quam ex imitatione gloriam, quae de rebus 
praeclare gestis exurgit, eamque comitatur ut umbra corpus, 
sibi ipsis quaesivisse. Ac potius vel intenta contentione 
adversatos prioribus vel adnixos longo eos intervallo praeterire, 
. Q" 1 34 . "b' non sequ1. U1 en1m assec a CUP1t semper esse, pr1mum S1 1 
nunquam vendicabit locum ad quem videtur vel naturae propensio, 
vel nescio qua certe ambitio totis viribus anhelare (p. 25). 
Bembo agrees that surpassing the model should be the goal, but believes 
this best accomplished by devoting oneself to one model (Virgil for epic, 
Cicero for prose): 
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sic profecto alius existere aliquando poterit, a quo cum 
reliqui omnes, tum etiam ipse Cicero superetur. Id autem nullo 
modo accidere facilius potest, quam si, quem anteire maxime 
cupimus, eum maxime imitemur (p. 56). 
Bembo is reversing Quintilian's statement that the follower must always 
be second. Bembo continues by proposing the following lex: 
primum, ut qui sit omnium optimus, eum nobis imitandum proponamus: 
deinde sic imitemur, ut assequi contendamus: nostra demum contentio 
omnis id respiciat, ut quem assequuti fuerimus, etiam praetereamus. 
Itaque duas illas in animis nostris egregias plurimarum maximarumque 
rerum confect rices aemulationem atque spem habeamus. Sed aemulatio 
semper cum imitatione coniuncta sit: spes vero ipsa nostra non tam 
quidem imitationem, quam successum imitationis subsequi rectissime 
potest (pp. 56-7). 
Pico and Bembo are coming very close to a distinction between imitation 
and emulation. For Pico imitation brings no glory and is equivalent 
to following; contentio and trying to surpass are superior. A few 
lines later Pico explicitly calls Virgil "aemulator veterum verius 
quam imitator," but not in the eristic terms he has just used. The 
third stage in Bembo's three-fold lex imitationis -- praetereamus --
represents aemulatio. The sentences which follow, however, show that 
he does not regard aemulatio as a technical term, but rather as a 
feeling like admiration. For a clear statement of imitation and 
emulation as different processes one must wait for Erasmus. 
The vestigia topos, perhaps the most common of the common 
places, appears as a support for both imitation and emulation. 
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Statius uses it to express his admiration for Virgil and to admit his 
own sense of inferiority in his address to his book at the end of the 
Thebaid: "vive, precor; nec tu divinam Aeneida tempta, / sed 10nge 
sequere et vestigia semper adora" (12.816_7).35 Vida advises the 
aspiring poet to follow Virgil's footsteps: "Ergo ipsum ante alios 
animo venerare Maronem, / Atque unum sequere, utque potes, vestigia 
serva"(1.208-9). In addition one finds numerous passages in which 
someone is praised or approved for following footsteps or is advised 
to do so in such authors as Seneca, Pliny, Longuei1, Vida, Do1et, 
36 Ricci, Parthenio, Ramus, Ascham, Stur~ and Harvey. Typical of these 
usages is Gira1di's remark to Ca1eagnini, "satis enim mihi 1ucrifecisse 
arbitror, si huius [Cicero's] vestigiis a1iquando inhaerere mihi fas fuerit" 
(Trattati,1.203). 
Gira1di's admission prompts Ca1cagnini to a forceful 
expression of the vestigia topos and another vivid eristic analogy 
as an argument for emulation: 
. 36a . A1ienis enim semper vestigiis haerere, et serperastrls, ut alt 
Varro, eum uti, qui per aetatem stare possit at que ingredi, non 
modo turpe est, sed pericu10sum etiam. Quom non facile eorum vires 
coa1escant, qui a1ienis pedibus incedunt, a1ienis manibus pugnant, 
a1ienis ocu1is vident, aliena lingua 10quuntur; sui denique obliti, 
alieno spiritu vivunt. Quippe hoc iis per me 1iceat qui nondum 
in suam tutelam venerunt, quique per aetatem praemanso adhuc 
cibo a1untur, quorum adhuc membra fasciis effinguntur. At quo-
rum adu1ta est aetas, et firmiores 1acerti, ii iam prodeant ex 
umbra, iam prosi1iant in camp um, iam cum ipso lanista contendant, a 
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quo olim solebant dictata accipere, suasque cum eo vires 
expendant nec cedant, sed contra potius adsurgant, pericu1um 
facturi, an ipsi quoque possint ordinem ducere, et suo Marte de 
gradu adversarium deiicere (Trattati 1.219). 
Ca1cagnini does not shy away from any contentiousness latent in 
emulation; he delights in his imagery of gladiatorial violence. The 
eristic close of his letter to Gira1di prevents one from slipping into 
any illusions about "generous emulation," a favorite phrase in the 
eighteenth century. One finds ferocity in imitative literature, not 
to mention in the vicious, ad hominem (one need only think of J. C. 
Sca1iger's attacks on Erasmus) "debates" over Ciceronianism, which 
one combatant, Francesco F1orido, by no means a mild man, justly 
characterized as follows: 
quae [imitatio] cum vehementer mu1torum animis non solum in 
Ita1ia sed et in a1iis regionibus, in quibus bonae 1itterae 
vigent, insederit, ita 1itteratorum ingenia torquet, ut nulla 
umquam de re acrius magisque capita1i inter eos odio meo 
iudicio certatum sit. 37 
Petrarch makes avoiding the footsteps of his predecessors 
a central principle of his conception of imitation, even though he 
recognizes the difficulty of the task: 
Etsi enim mille passim ta1ia in poetis sint, ubi scilicet alter 
a1terius verbis usus est, michi tamen nichi1 operosius in 
scribendo nichi1que diffici1ius se offert, quam et mei ipsius 
et multo maxime precedentium vitare vestigia (Fam. 23.19.15). 
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In another letter to Boccaccio Petrarch reelaborates Seneca's vestigia 
topos, passages which also contain forceful examples of dux and via 
(semita, callis) used to prefer emulation to imitation: 
Quid ergo? non ibo per priorum vestigia? ego vero utar via 
vetere, sed si propiorem planioremque invenero, hanc muniam. 
Qui ante nos ista move runt non domini nostri sed duces sunt 
(ep. ~. 33.11). 
Petrarch's expansion of these lines from Seneca is a good example of 
his persistent attempt to make his practice conform to his theory. 
After quoting assertions of originality from Juvenal (7.53-5), 
Horace (epis. 1-19.21, quoted above), Lucretius (1.926-7=4.1-2, quoted 
above), and Virgil (Q. 3.292-3), Petrarch asserts his own originality 
by emulating Seneca: 
Quid ergo? Sum quem priorum semitam, sed non semper aliena 
vestigia sequi iuvet; sum qui aliorum scriptis non furtim sed 
precario uti velim in tempore, sed dum liceat, meis malim; 
sum quem similitudo delectet, non identitas, et similitudo 
ipsa quoque non nimia, in qua sequacis lux ingenii emineat, non cecitas 
non paupertas; sum qui sat ius rear duce caruisse quam cogi 
per omnia ducem sequi. Nolo ducem qui me vinciat sed precedat; 
sint cum duce oculi, sit iudicium, sit libertas; non prohibear 
ubi velim pedem ponere et preterire aliqua et inaccessa tentare; 
et breviorem sive ita fert animus, planiorem callem sequi et 
properare et subsistere et divertere liceat et reverti (Fam. 22.2.20_1).31 
Petrarch follows his advice: "Utendum igitur ingenio alieno utendumque 
coloribus, abstinendum verbis" (Fam. 23.19.13). He only reproduces 
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the common phrase, "Quid ergo?", which by itself alerts no one to this 
passage in Seneca. He uses Seneca's figures -- vestigia, via, dux 
but changes the wording: "priorum semitam" for "priorum vestigia," 
"breviorem . p1aniorem" for "propriorem p1anioremque," "semitam" 
and "ca11em" for "via." He omits the contrast between "domini" and 
"duces." He preserves Seneca's general idea, but adds to it with his 
characteristic concern with theft. He even corrects Seneca by implying 
he did not go far enough, by suggesting that the rejection of "domini" 
is not enough. Petrarch wants a guide too, but one of a special kind. 
He wants his independence from his guide and by expressing his desire 
he is asserting his own independence from Seneca's text. 39 
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The proliferation of eristic metaphors allows one to make a 
distinction between two types of imita~ion and emulation. Although such 
a distinction is implicit in writings on ~mitation from Horace's epist. 
1.19 on, no one makes it explicitly, as far as I know, until Erasmus, 
who does not adopt emulation as a technical term. 40 Usually the 
distinction emerges in the metaphoric contrasts I have been tracing: 
servile/free (in Horace), follower/competitor or surpasser, thief/ 
borrower-transformer, ape/man. I would like to suggest that aemulatio 
does not emerge as a technical term for the freer, more competitive and 
trans formative type of imitation at least partly because of its ambiguous 
moral significance. 41 
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Cicero's Tusculanae disputationes 4.17 gives both meanings 
of aemulatio: 
aemulatio autem dupliciter ilIa quidem dicitur, ut et in laude 
et in vitio nomen hoc sit; nam et imitatio virtutis aemulatio 
dicitur . . et est aemulatio aegritudo, si eo quod concupierit 
alius potiatur, ipse careat. 
Nonius defines the envious aspect of aemulatio by contrasting it with 
imitatio: 
aemulatio ab imitatione hoc distat, quod imitatio simplex est 
et livorem atque invidiam non admittit; aemulatio autem habet 
quidem imitandi studium, sed cum malitiae operatione (437 M). 
Envy, contentious striving, jealous rivalry cling to aemulatio and 
hinder its usefulness as a descriptive term; an overtone of 
condemnation threatens to interfere. In Pliny, for example, who uses 
aemulatio in literary contexts much more frequently than his predecessors, 
it does not acquire the status of a technical term independent of 
imitatio and occasionally requires an apology. In epist 1.2 Pliny 
is sending a speech to a friend for correction: 
Temptaui enim imitari Demosthenen semper tuum, Caluum nuper 
meum, dumtaxat figuris orationis; nam uim tantorum uirorum, 
'pauci quos aequus .• • ' adsequi possunt. Nec materia ipsa 
huic (uereor ne improbe dicam) aemulationi repugnauit (2-3). 
Pliny here uses imitari, adsegui, and aemulatio interchangeably; he 
is following his models, not contending with them, imitating not 
emulating them. But when using aemulatio as a synonym for imitatio, 
he is afraid of laying himself open to a charge of presumptuous 
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contentiousness and excuses himself with "uereor ne improbe dicam" 
in accordance with rhetorical doctrine on using too daring an expression 
(e.g., Quintilian 8.3.37). In a passage quoted earlier from epist 7.9 
Pliny is advocating aemulatio in translation. He qualifies his use of 
aemulus with quasi: "quasi aemulum scribere lectisque conferre." 
Then he explains why this certare, this contentio is audax but not 
improba; it is a private exercise, not a public attempt to shine. In 
another letter Pliny rejects the moral excess of aeumlari for the 
neutral imitari and sequi;he admits he was using Demosthenes' speech 
against Meidios: 
Quam sane, cum componerem illos, habui in manibus, non ut aemulare r 
(improbum enim ac paene furiosum), sed tamen imitarer et sequerer, 
quantum aut diuersitas ingeniorum maximi et minimi, aut causae 
dissimilitudo pateretur (7.30.5). 
Regardless of the reasons why aemulatio does not become a technical 
term in antiquity, it has considerable usefulness as a designation 
for the type of imitation advocated by eristic metaphors. Erasmus, 
the first person to distinguish between imitatio and aemulatio, uses 
eristic diction: 
lam sunt arguti quidam qui distinguunt imitationem ab 
aemulatione. Siquidem imitatio spectat similitudinem, 
aemulatio uictoriam. Itaque si totum et unum Ciceronem 
tibi proposueris, non in hoc tantum ut ilIum exprimas, 
uerum etiam ut uincas; non praetercurrendus erit, sed 
relinquendus magis (p. 116).42 
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One would like to know who these clever fellows are, if Erasmus has 
someone particular in mind, is referring to an idea "in the air," or 
is just being casual without intending to be taken literally.43 In 
any event aemulatio for Erasmus is competitive, eristic. Towards 
the end of his dialogue he returns to the distinction after alluding 
to Poliziano's vestigia topos:44 
Rursus M. Tullium in parte studiorum, praecipuum ac primum esse 
uolo, non solum, nec sequendum tantum puto, sed imitandum 
potius, atque aemulandum etiam. Etenim qUi sequitur, alienis 
ingreditur uestigiis, et seruit praescripto. Porro uere dictum 
est, eum non posse bene ambulare, qui pedem semper ponit in 
alieno uestigio: nec unquam bene natare, qui non audet abiicere 
suber. Imitator autem non tam eadem dicere studet quam similia, 
imo ne similia quid em interdum, sed paria magis. Aemulator 
uero contendit etiam melius dicere si possit(p.302). 
At the very least aemulatio includes the attempt to surpass the 
model, and this attempt generally has important consequences for a 
reader of imitative poetry because it conflicts with dissimulative 
advice. Aemulatio calls attention to itself and deliberately challenges 
comparison with its model. The relation between text and model becomes 
an important element in the text itself. A passage from Vida shows 
how dissimilation yields to aemulatio; he regards them as mutually 
exclusive and concludes (3.243-4) by advocating open emulative theft: 
Quum vero cultis moliris furta poetis, 
Cautius ingredere, & raptus memor occule versis 
Verborum indiciis, atque ordine falle legentes 
Mutato. nova sit facies, nova prorsus imago. 
Munere (nec longum tempus) vix ipse peracto 
DiCta recognosces veteris mutato poetae. 
Saepe palam quidam rapiunt, cupiuntque videri 
Omnibus intrepidi, ac furto laetantur in ipso 
Deprensi, seu quum dictis nihil ordine verso 
Longe alios iisdem sensus mira arte dedere, 
Exueruntque animos verborum impune priores. 
Seu quum certandi priscis succensa libido, 
Et possessa diu sed enim male condita vic tis 
Extorquere manu juvat, in meliusque referre (3.217-30). 
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What Vida is here saying about style can apply to matters of inventio 
and dispositio. The important point is that the rejection of 
dissimulation reduces and potentially eliminates some of the 
difficulties raised by transformative and dissimulative doctrine. A 
reader can feel justified by this aspect of aemulatio in interpreting 
a resemblance between two texts as an allusion. A reader can feel 
justified in expecting a text to assert its difference from its model 
and to make use of that difference. 
Aemulatio, of course, is no panacea; difficulties remain. The 
reader starts with a resemblance between texts, not with a map pointing 
to emulations as opposed to imitations. Even if the author, Petrarch, 
Poliziano, or Jonson, for example, has expressed a preference for 
emulation, there is no guarantee that he may not borrow a phrase here 
and there in a nontransformative, nonemulative fashion. For authors 
who have not written on imitation/emulation one can only try to deduce 
from their work which type of imitation they approve and practice. 
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Also, it is difficult to be sure if an emulation is striving with 
the structure, themes, premises of its model or only striving with 
the expression; the emulation may not extend beyond a stylistic trick, 
as often in Vida. Frequently a major interpretive difficulty arises 
in trying to determine if an emulation is reworking a particular 
passage or a topos; one is not sure just what is being contended with. 
Nevertheless the awareness of the emulative option can guide 
one's interpretation of numerous ancient and Renaissance texts. But 
can one learn more from eristic metaphors? I would like to propose that 
they cast light on the way in which a text may differ from its model. 
For the repeated emphasis on conflict suggests that the text may 
criticise, correct, or revise its model. Petrarch's emulation of 
Seneca's vestigia topos is a case in point. Petrarch implies that 
Seneca's conception of having a gUide (dux) is not rigorous enough: 
a dux, too, may be a dominus unless the author is careful to preserve 
his independence. A particularly striking example is Milton's use of 
Satan to belittle traditional epic conceptions of heroism in his 
attempt to write an epic of Christian heroism: "the better fortitude/ 
Of Patience and Heroic Martyrdom/ Unsung" (PL 9.31-3) or "deeds/ 
Above Heroic, though in secret done" (PR 1.14-15). The example of 
Milton shows that an emulative striving with a model or a tradition 
may depend upon a profound awareness of historical change and difference. 
An awareness of historical difference plays a crucial role in Erasmus' 
conception of imitation and deserves separate consideration. 
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NOTES 
1. For a good overview of different versions of imitation in 
antiquity see Richard McKeon, "Literary Criticism and the Conception 
of Imitation in Antiquity," Modern Philology 34 (1936), 1-35. 
2. Hermann Gmelin, "Das Prinzip der Imitatio in den romanischen 
Literaturen der Renaissance," Romanische Forschungen 46 (1932), 
83-360; Jurgen V. Stackelberg, "Das Bienengleichnis: Ein Beitrag 
zur Geschichte der literarischen Imitatio," Romanische Forschungen 
68 (1956), 271-93. 
3. See Le Familiari, ed. Vittorio Rossi and Umberto Bosco (Firenze: 
Sansoni, 1933-42), 1.8.3-4 and cf. Erasmus, II Ciceroniano, ed. 
Angiola Gambara (Brescia: La Scuola Editrice, 1965), p. 204. 
4. Nevertheless Macrobius does change what he finds in Seneca. The 
most revealing additions are quoted in the text, but are not the 
only ones. [he comparison in section 8 does not come from Seneca. 
Macrobius also omits large portions of Seneca's letter: the 
digression on natural history, the contrast between father/son and 
man/imago, the ''nJagni vir ingenii" who impresses his own form on 
what he draws from others. The omission of the "magni vir ingenii" 
may be due to Macrobius' modesty (cf. his own concern over his 
ability to write good Latin, sections llff), but it might reflect 
his shift of emphasis from transformation to orderly management: 
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he does not want his material to be unrecognized, as Seneca asserts 
can happen. Also, the resemblance of father to son is irrelevant 
to Macrobius' transforming redisposition. These examples correspond 
to two of the major categories of change which Sturm, Ricci, Ascham 
and other Renaissance theorists use in analyzing imitation --
adjectio and detractio -- and one finds several examples of the 
third, immutatio: for example, the substitution of dividunt for 
digerunt or "in unius saporis UBum varia libamenta confundit" (1. pro 
6) for Seneca's "in unum saporem varia ilIa libamenta confundere" (5). 
Consequently, Petrarch's criticism is not entirely just: "non enim 
flores apud Senecam lectos in favos vert ere studuit, sed 
integros et quales in alienis ramis invenerat, protulit" (Fam.1.8.3). 
5. Macrobius excuses his reproduction of others' words as follows: 
"nec mihi vitio vertas, si res quas ex lectione varia mutuabor 
ipsis saepe verbis quibus ab ipsis auctoribus enarratae sunt 
explicabo; quia praesens opus non eloquentiae ostentationem, sed 
noscendoruum congeriem pollicetur" (1. pro 4). Borrowing and its 
unscrupulous cousin, theft, like culling flowers are major images 
of nontransformative imitation. 
6. Actually, Macrobius borrows indigeste from Gellius, of whose preface 
he makes frequent use in his own preface. For this sentence see 
NA pro 2-3. Willis notes other borrowings from Gellius in his 
Teubner edition of the Saturna~ia. Macrobius' blending of Gellius 
and Seneca illustrates his own practice of imitation, eclectic 
reordering, not transformation, florilegium, not honey. 
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7. "Oratio super Fabio Quintiliano et Statii Sylvis," in Prosatori 
latini del Quattrocento (Milano-Napoli: Ricciardi, 1952), p. 878. 
The lines from Lucretius are 3.11-2. 
8. See the letter to Cortesi, Prosatori, pp. 902-4. 
9. The other three instances are in "L'Hylas" (Oeuvres completes, 
ed. Gustave Cohen [Paris: Gallimard, 1950], vol. 2, pp. 390-1), 
"Response aux injures et calomnies" (2.614), and "Epistre a 
Charles, Cardinal de Lorraine" (2.862). I owe these references 
to Grahame Castor, Pleiade Poetics: A Study in Sixteenth Centu1J1:. 
Thought and Terminology (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1964), p. 72. 
10. Marcel Raymond, L'in;t;luence de Ronsard sur 113, poesie fran"aise 
(1550-1585) (paris: Honore Champion, 1927), vol. 2, p. 190,refers 
to this work as "une pesante I somme ,I, and calls des Caurres "un 
compilateur infatigable." 
11. Giovambattista Giraldi Cinzio, "Super imitatione epistula," in 
Trattati di poetica e retorica del Cinquecento, ed. Bernard Weinberg 
(Bari: Laterza, 1970-4), vol. 1, pp. 199-200. 
12. Petrus Ramus, Ciceronianus (Paris, 1557), p. 18. 
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Fam. 1.8.23. One should not miss the pun, mel/melius. In fact, 
it is worth noting that the earliest appearances of the poet/bee 
'\ / ~ I ~"A'TToI. !f'v~.~ • .s 
\ "/ I ~ lI-J..f(TOV J,"~ 1&1'.'" ~~ ... " •• J,. ... 
comparison occur as puns: 
I I J ~ no"f;"" , (Aristophanes, Birds 748-50) and ~ e:~O\ln ~<l-I' ff{'O$ 
\ <I , , ~ I ") ( ( ~I''''''''''v J'A ~>-'ffVT,",V &-" 
"'1 ... 1: \ ~, MO\""'IrJ.C. oTt .. no 
.... \ .... Sf f:T1~ .,\10< \ I I 1'<"). .., jVlO&l~:;" K.., rr'"'v 7"1""''' 1<,1.1 VJ.1T'""V TJ.. 
< \ ~ \ <I 
, 
1 <I I"-~ ~ IrT'!" ( '" 1t:po"".,,' ... trnl::f ,(, l<.h J,\J ral O\lr ..... TTt: 10Jk'" I/gi. .., .... IV 
(Plato, Ion 534a-b). Marius Victorinus (Grammatici Latini. ed. 
Heinrich Keil, vol. 6 [Leipzig, 1884], p. 184), in a list of 
possible derivations of it ~~.s. offers the following: "quibusdam 
placet ab apibus, quae graece A1~lrr~' dicuntur.nam sicut illae 
, 
omni cura flores legunt; ut mella conficiant. K'" 
<I 
Dr, 
hoc studium, 11~~ , .... .udicuntur. in scriptura quoque 
quid quid floris est in sono vocis et rhythmis ad componenda 
~ \" 
colligimus, ut auribus tradamus, unde et Homerus, 0 u KJ.. J. no 
I I ( I ?' 
-"I ",>.,"1"0$ \,..1."", ... " Pf:&V J,.oJ$-'>t [.Y:.. 1.249]. nam veluti gustu 
vocis aures pabulantur." (lowe this reference to v. Stackelberg, 
p. 277, n.5.) For perhaps the earliest extant comparison of 
poet and bee, which also contains a play on it :>,,"'''.J. / .... ~'>...., , see 
Simonides (page 88) and Hermann Frankel. Gnomon 25 (1953), 388, 
who is convinced that Horace Od. 4.2.27ff is alluding to Simonides. 
One also finds transformative apian metaphors not mentioned by v. 
Stackelberg in Giulio Camillo Delminio, "Della imitazione," Trattati 
1.164-5 and "Timber," Ben Jonson, ed. C. H. Herford, Percy and 
Evelyn Simpson, vol. 8 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1947) 
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p. 639. M. Antonius Muretus, Variarum Lectionum libri viii 
(Venice, 1559), book 8, chap. 1, contains a gathering apian 
metaphor -- which excellently characterizes Muretus' own procedure 
in that work. Valla has an interesting contrast between the 
transformative bee and the thieving ant in "In quartum 1ibrum 
ElegantiarulII praefatio," (Prosatori, p. 612). 
14. See the letter to Poliziano, Prosatori, p. 910: "Fieri enim non 
potest quin varia ciborum genera male concoquantur, et quin ex 
tanta co1luvione dissimillimi generis inter se verba collidantur." 
15. Quintilian 10.1.19; Macrobius, Sat. 1, pro 3,7, Petrarch, 
Fam. 22.2.12, Seniles 2.3; Poliziano, Prosatori, p. 904; Erasmus 
pp. 176, 178, 290 (quoted below), 300; Celio Calcagnini, "Super 
imitatione commentatio," Trattati 1.213, Etienne Dolet, De 
Imitatione Ciceroniana, in Emile V. Te1le, L'Erasmianus sive 
Ciceronianus d'Etienne Dolet (1535) (Geneve: Droz, 1974), pp. 18, 
63, 76, 91 (quoted in next note); Francesco Florido, Succisivarum 
lectionum libri tres (Basel, 1539), p. 126; du Bellay, La Deffence 
et illustration de la langue francoyse, ed. Henri Chamard 
(Paris: Didier, 1970), p. 42; Sidney, An Apo1ogie for Poetrie, 
in Elizabethan Critical Essays, ed. G. Gregory Smith (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1904), vol. I, p. 203; Jonson, 8.638. 
In order not to burden the text unnecessarily I will here list some 
examples of the monkey and crow metaphors, which always (with the 
exception of Villani, who calls Salutati "scimmia di Cicerone" 
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as a compliment) are used pejoratively to indicate particularly 
slavish, nontransformative imitation. For the ape see Horace, 
sat. 1.10.18; Seneca the Elder, contr. 9.3. 12-3; the three ancient 
and numerous medieval uses of simia cited by Ernst Robert Curtius, 
European Literature and the Latin Middle Ages, tr. Willard R. Trask 
(Princeton, Princeton UniversityPress,1953),pp.538-40; ~illipo 
Villani, Le vite d'uomini illustri fiorentini, cited by Gambaro, 
Ciceroniano, p. xxxii; Petrarch, Fam. 23.19.13; Poliziano, Prosator~, 
p. 902; Cortesi, Prosatori, p. 906 and "De hominibus doctis 
dialogus," in Philippi Villani Liber de civitatis Florentiae famosis 
civibus, ed. Gustavus Camillus Galetti (Firenze, 1847), p. 234; 
Giovanfrancesco Pico, pp. 29, 63, 70, 71; Erasmus, with whom 
simius is a favorite term of mockery, pp. 86, 100, 108, 118, 136, 
etc.; Sperone Speroni, Opere (Venezia, 1740), vol. 2, p. 365 (joined 
with a crow comparison); du Bellay, p. 107; Gabriel Harvey, 
Ciceronianus, ed. Harold S. Wilson (Lincon: University of Nebraska, 
1945), p. 80, alluding to Erasmus, p. 100. Horace, epis. 1.3.19, 
reworks the Aesopian fable of the crow and the stolen plumage to 
dissuade Celsus from plundering the Palatine library for his 
writings. After Horace, the cornicula becomes a commonplace: 
Petrarch, Fam. 22.2.17; Pico, p. 3.4: Erasmus, p. 204; Calcagnini, 
Trattati 1.216; Speroni 2.365; Bartolomeo Ricci, De imitatione 
(Venice, 1545), p. 75; Johann Sturm, De imititatione oratori~ 
(Strassbourg, 1574), schola to book 3, chap. 1 (quoted below); 
Harvey, p. 54 (perhaps alluding to Ricci). 
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16. Ciceroniano, p. 290. The representative nature of this passage 
is highlighted by the fact that it is one of the very few passages 
of which Dolet, in his attack on Erasmus, approves: "Docte monet 
et probe, quos ita ad imitationem hortatur, ut non quicquid arridet, 
orationi continuo attexant, sed quae ad imitationem a scriptoribus 
sumunt, in stomachum transiiciant, et bene concoquant, ut 
transmisuum in vaenas, velut nostrum renascatur, non videatur 
aliunde corrogatum" (p. 91). 
17. Cf. Ciceroniano, p. 136. 
18. Seneca, ~ mor. 84. 8; Petrarch, Fam. 23.19.11; Cortesi, 
Prosatori, pp. 906 (quoted by Erasmus, p. 298), 908. Pico 
criticizes Cortesi's comparison, p. 63. 
19. For a penetrating discussion of this passage see Thomas M. 
Greene, "Petrarch and the Humanist Hermenentic," Italian Literature, 
Roots and Branches, ed. Giose Rimane11i and Kenneth John Atchity 
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1976), pp. 211ff. I am 
greatly indebted to Greene's essay. 
20. Because of the inaccuracies of the printed editions of the 
Disputationes I cite from the manuscript, written by Pietro Cennini 
in 1474, preserved in the Laurentian Library (Plut. 53.28). This 
passage appears f. 197v. 
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21. Bernardino Parthenio, DelIo imitazione poetica (Venezia, 1560), 
p. 48. 
22. See Ascham's important letter to Sturm, written just before his 
death, The Whole Works of Roger Ascham, ed. Giles (London, 1864), 
vol. 2, p. 175. 
23. Cf. Elaine Fantham, "Imitation and Decline: Rhetorical Theory 
and Practice in the First Century After Christ," Classical 
Philology 73 (1978), 110. 
24. Spenser, Poetical Works, ed. J. C. Smith and E. de Se1incourt 
~xford: Oxford University Press, 1912), p. 418. 
25. The "De Arte Poetica" of Marco Girolamo Vida, ed. and tr. 
Ralph G. Williams (New York: Columbia University Press, 1976), 
3. 257-8. 
26. Quoted by Pierre de Nolhac, Petrarque et l'humanisme (Paris: 
Honore Champion, 1907), vol. 2, p. 92. De No1hac, p. 91, shows 
that Silvanus is a name Petrarch often used for himself. 
27. For a thorough treatment of theft and imitation see Eduard 
Stemp1inger, Das P1agiat in der griechischen Literatur (Leipzig 
and Berlin: Teubner, 1912) esp. "Literarische 
pp. 121-67. 
43 
28. Cf. Sturm, De im. oratoria 1.11. 
29. One finds a strikingly similar bit of advice in Petrarch, who 
of course did not know On the Sublime, in Seniles 2.3. He tells 
Bruni to consider his own productions as if an enemy had written 
them; see Petrarch, Opera (Basel, 1554), p. 840. 
30. Quintilian is taking issue with Crassus' speech, de orat. 1.154. 
For Renaissance discussions of paraphrase with reference to 
Quintilian's debate with Cicero see Calcagnini, Trattati 1.2l6-7,who 
supports Cicero if the prescribed passage is excellent, Sturm, 
De im. oratoria 1. 11, who opposes paraphrase in the same language, 
and Ascham, The Scholemaster, ed. R. J. Schoeck (Don Mills, 
Ontario: Dent, 1966), pp. 83-90, who is indignant with 
Quintilian for even disagreeing with Cicero. 
31. One finds eristic expressions in later translators. See, for 
example, St. Jerome on Hilarius, "qui homilias in lob et in psalmos 
tractatus plurimos in Latinum vertit e Graeco nec adsedit litterae 
dormitanti et putida rusticorum interpretatione setorsit, sed 
quasi captivos sensus in suam linguam victoris iure transposuit" 
(epis.57, quoted by Hans Eberhard Richter, Uebersetzen und 
Uebersetzungen in der romischen Literatur [diss. Erlangen, 1938}, 
p. 41). Ermolao Barbaro, a close friend of Poliziano, prefaces 
his translation to Themistius with the declaration: "in plenum, 
non tam latinum. reddere Themistium, quam certare cum eo volui" 
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(quoted by Eugenio Garin, L'umanesimo italiano [1947; Bari: 
Laterza, 1975], p. 120. 
32. For a formulation dependent on Quintilian see Daniel Barbaro, 
"Della eloquenza," Trattati 2.359. 
33. Arno Reiff, interpretatio, imitatio, aemulatio: Begriff und 
Vorstellung literarischer Abhangigkeit bei den Ramern (diss. 
Kaln, 1959), pp. 73ff. For further discussion of Reiff's thesis 
see below, n. 40. 
34. Assecla reads like a direct slap at Cortesi, whom Pico criticizes 
in his second letter to Bembo (pp. 63-4). See Cortesi to Poliziano, 
Prosatori, p. 908: "ego malo esse assecla et simia Ciceronis 
quam alumnus aut filius aliorum." 
35. Statius expresses his sense of inferiority vis-a-vis Virgil more 
explicitly after his imitation of the Nisus and Euryalus episode; 
see Th. 10.445-8. 
36. Seneca, ep. mor. 79.16; Pliny, epist.6.11.2; Longueil, quoted by 
Telle, L'Erasmianus, p. 313; Vida 1.208-9 (quoted below), 3.584; 
Dolet, p. 66; Ricci, p. 66v; P,artnenio, pp. 65, 87; Ramus, p. 78; 
Ascham, letter to Sturm pp. 180, 181; Sturm, Nobilitas Literata 
(1538; Jena, 1680), p. 23; Harvey, pp. 82, 102. 
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36a . Weinberg prints "semper astris" for "serperastris"; see Caelius 
Calcagninus, Opera (Basel, 1544), p. 275. Calcagnini is referring 
to Varro,de lingua latina 9.11. 
37. Francesco Florido, Adversus Stephani Doleti Calumnias (Rome, 1541), 
p. 7, quoted by Eduard Norden, Die antike Kumstprosa vom vi. 
Jahrhundert v. Chr. bis in die Zeit -der RenaissanceS (Darmstadt: 
Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1958), p. 773. 
38. In my opinion there is no doubt that Petrarch is emulating the 
passage from Seneca rather than just using a topoi. Petrarch 
refers to ep. mor. 33.7, a section against "captare flosculos," 
in three different letters (Fam. 1.3.4, 4.15.17, 24.1.9). The 
second of these letters contains a long exhortation, based 
on Seneca, not to excerpt and paraphrases the via and vestigia 
sentence: "Placet ignota tentare, ubi sepe viam non inveniens 
aut vageris aut corruas; placet illorum segui vestigia ... " 
(4.15.18). For Petrarch's thorough acquaintance with Seneca, 
especially the letters to Lucilius, see de Nolhac, vol. 2, pp. 
115-26. It is ironic that Petrarch is violating his own advice 
against "captare flosculos" and excepting from commentaries in 
Fam. 22.2; his quotation from Lucretius comes from Macrobius 
(Sat. 6.2.3). Petrarch, as de Nolhac, vol. 1, pp. 159-60 shows, 
has no first-hand knowledge of Lucretius. 
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39. One final vestigia topos deserves citation because at least two 
other authors -- Erasmus,pp. 296, 302 (quoted below), and Parthenio, 
p. 107 -- approve and quote it. I refer to Poliziano's (Prosator~, 
p. 904): "Sed ut bene currere non potest qui pedem ponere studet 
in alienis tantum vestigiis, ita nec bene scriberequi tamquam de 
praescripto non audet egredi. 11 A few examples of dux to 
advocate or approve close imitation: Petrarch, Fam. 24.4.4-5; 
24.7.3; 24.9.1; 24.12,3,18,22,23,24,42; Cortesi, Prosatori pp. 906, 
910; Bembo, pp. 51,54, Dolet, p. 56; Ascham, letter to Sturm, 
p. 182; Levin to Harvey, Ciceronianus, p. 38. One finds path 
used similarly in Bembo, p. 56; Vida 3.185; Dolet, p. 66. 
Quintilian (10.5.7), Pico (p. 26), and Levin (Harvey, p. 38) use 
via to support emulation. 
40. Reiff claims that aemulatio becomes a fixed critical term in the 
age of Tiberius (pp. 73ff). The evidence does not hear him out. 
Phaedrus' use of aemulatio, 2 ep. 7, is more plausibly explained 
as moral than technical; his prologues and epilogues are obsessed 
with envy and the criticism he may receive (calumniari, 1. prol. 5; 
livor, obtrectare, 2 ep. 10; livor, 3. prol. 60, obtrectare 4. 
prol. 15-6; livor, 4.22.1; invidia, 5, prol. 9). But the major 
objections to taking aemulatio as a technical term are that it 
often appears as a synonym for imitatio and that Quintilian in 
10.2 and Seneca in ep. mor. 84, the two most extended and most 
important discussions of imitation in the first century (and 
perhaps in any other), discussions which Reiff curiously neglects, 
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do not use aemulatio, although they are advocating it. Quintillianls 
only use of aemulari in 10.2 occurs at section 17 in a list of 
imitators who fall into the vitia nearest to the virtutes of their 
models; the context shows that he is just varying his verbs, not 
using a technical term. At 10.1.61 Quintilian refers to Horace's 
"Pindarum quisquis studet aemulari" (Od. 4.2.1) as follows: 
"propter quae Horatius eum merits nemini credit imitabilem." 
And Pliny, who frequently has aemulor and aemulatio to describe 
literary relationships, often uses it synonomously with imitatio, 
for instance in epist. 1.2.2-3 and 1.5.12-3, as Reiff admits (p. 85), 
and 8.6.13. At 6.11.2 Pliny makes aemulari and "meis instare vesti-
giis" synonomous. Pliny's joining of improba with aemulatio at 
1.2.3 and 7.30.5 suggests that he has its ambiguous moral 
significance, not a technical literary one, in mind. I do not 
question the existence of varying conceptions of imitation in the 
first century, nor do I challenge the usefulness of aemulutio to 
describe one of them, provided that one realizes that it is not 
an ancient technical term. (For similar criticisms of Reiff, see 
the review by Manfred Fuhrmann, ~ 33 [1961],445-8). 
41. Cf. Giorgio Pasquali, Orazio lirico (Firenze: LeMonnier, 1920) 
pp. 119-23. 
42. Cf. Erasmus' opposition of sequi/praeire, p. 172. After Erasmus, 
Ricci refers to a distinction between imitatio and aemulatio as 
well known. Ricci is about to discuss, at length, Virgil's emulation, 
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in his treatment of Dido, of Catullus' Ariadne, but prefaces 
his remarks with the excuse: " . utriusque carmen in medium 
descriptuum adducam, si mihi tamen prius a doctissimis vir is 
cavebo, ne mihi id vitio, aut etiam ignorantiae vertant, quod 
quae aemulationis sunt, ea ego imitationi propria attribuam, nam 
cum sequi, imitari, aemulari tria sint omnino specie diversa, 
genere tamen quodam sit similia, ut quod sit alius, vicissim 
ad alius commoditatem sine vitio transferri potest • . " 
(p. 43v). Ricci himself does not strictly distinguish between 
imitatio and aemulatio in his own usage; they are interchangeable 
terms, e.g. p. 43: "Iam vero iterum Sannazarius, cum agit de 
virginis partu, quam bellus est Maronis imitator, quam prudenter 
videt quae aemuletur. " Ricci's segui/imitari/aemulari 
formulation resembles Bembo's above-quoted progression from 
imitandum to assegui contendamus to praetereamus, to which 
Daniel Barbaro, a member of Bembo's circle in Venice, is indebted 
in his "Della eloquenza" (1557): "Et in brieve, bisogna aprir 
gli occhi e nello imitare i dotti et eccellenti uomini si richiede 
considerare di che forma essi sieno piu abondanti e di che meno, 
acci; che sapendo per qual cagione essi stati sieno tali, ancora 
non sia tolto id potere agli studiosi di accostarsi loro, et 
agu~gliarli, e se possibile e (che pure e possible al modo gia 
detto) di superargli" (Trattati 2.450). To those gradations of 
imitation one can add Sturm's opposition between servile and free 
imitation, De im. oratoria 1.2. 
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43. As observed earlier, Pico and Bembo come closest to making a 
distinction between imitatio and aemulatio. Perhaps Erasmus 
heard it during his stay in Rome in 1509, during which visit he 
heard the Ciceronian sermon which alarmed him so much (see 
Ciceroniano, p. 1vii-1viii and pp. 128ff). In any event Erasmus 
claims that he did not know the corresponence between Pico and 
Bembo until after the publication of the Ciceronianus: see the 
letter to V1atten, 24 January 1529, Ciceroniano, p. 326 
44. Gambaro, in his fine edition of the Ciceronianus, makes a curious 
omission in his note to this passage. He compares "bene nat are 
... et abiicere suber" with Horace's "nabis sine cortic~' (sat. 
1.4.120). The more relevant reference is to Po1iziano's vestigia 
sentence (see note 39), which Erasmus quotes p. 296; earlier in 
the same letter to Cortesi Po1iziano writes: "tum demum ve1im quod 
dicitur sine cortice nates" (Prosatori, p. 904). 
